Abstract. When merging belief functions, Dempster rule of combination is justified only when sources can be considered as independent. When dependencies are ill-known, it is usual to ask the merging operation to satisfy the property of idempotence, as this property ensures a cautious behaviour in the face of dependent sources. There are different strategies to find such rules for belief functions. One strategy is to rely on idempotent rules used in either more general or more specific frameworks and to respectively study their particularisation or extension to belief functions. In this paper, we try to extend the minimum rule of possibility theory to belief functions. We show that such an extension is not always possible, unless we accept the idea that the result of the fusion process can be a family of belief functions.
Introduction
The main merging rule in the theory of evidence is Dempster's rule [4] , even if other proposals exist [17] . Combining belief functions by Dempster's rule is justified only when sources can be considered as independent. In other cases, a specific dependence structure between sources can be assumed, and suitable alternative merging rules can be used (e.g., the commensuration method [13, 7] ). However, assuming that the (in)dependence structure between sources is well-known is often unrealistic. In those cases, an alternative is to adopt a conservative approach when merging belief functions, by applying the "least commitment principle", which states that one should never presuppose more beliefs than justified. This principle is basic in the frameworks of possibility theory, imprecise probability [19] , and the Transferable Belief Model (TBM) [18] . This cautious approach can be interpreted and used in different ways [6, 2, 7] . However, all these approaches agree on the fact that a cautious conjunctive merging rule should satisfy the property of idempotence, as this property ensures that the same information supplied by two dependent sources will remain unchanged after merging.
There are mainly three strategies to construct idempotent rules that make sense in the belief function setting. The first one looks for idempotent rules that satisfy a certain number of desired properties and appear sensible in the framework of belief functions. This is the solution retained by Denoeux [6] and Cattaneo [2] . The second strategy relies on the natural idempotent rule consisting of intersecting sets of probabilities and tries to express it in the particular case of belief functions (Chateauneuf [3] ). Finally, the third approach, explored in this paper, starts from the natural idempotent rule in a less general framework, possibility theory, trying to extend it to belief functions. Namely, we study the generalisation of the minimum rule, viewing possibility distributions as contour functions of consonant belief functions [16] . If we denote by (m 1 , F 1 ), (m 2 , F 2 ) two belief functions, P 1 , P 2 two sets of probabilities, and π 1 , π 2 two possibility distributions, the three approaches are summarized in Figure 1 below.
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Fig. 1. Search of idempotent merging rules
Section 2 recalls basics of belief functions and defines conjunctive merging in this framework. Section 3 then studies to what extent the minimum rule of possibility theory can be extended to the framework of belief functions. The idea is to request that the contour function after merging be the minimum of the contour functions of the input belief functions, what we call the strong contour function principle. Note that a similar property holds for the unnormalized Dempster rule with respect to the product of contour functions. In the case of the minimum rule, we are led to propose a weak contour principle as the former condition turns out to be too strong.
Preliminaries
This section introduces the basics of belief functions needed in this paper. In the whole paper, we consider that information pertains to a variable V taking its values on a finite space V, with generic element denoted v.
Belief Functions
Suppose that beliefs can be modelled by a belief function, or, equivalently, by a basic belief assignment (bba), that is, a function m from the power set 2 |V| of V to [0, 1] such that A⊆V m(A) = 1. Let M V be the set of bba's on 2 |V| . A set A such that m(A) > 0 is called a focal set. We denote by F the set of focal sets corresponding to bba m, and (m, F) a belief structure. m(A) is the mass of A. Given a bba m, belief, plausibility and commonality functions of an event E ⊆ V are:
